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Despite the promising advances in the construction and use of social indicators, there has been 
little application to the formulation, monitoring, or evaluation of foreign policy. In the formula- 
tion stage--our concern here--predictor or early warning indicators could be very useful. The 
9 annual "state of the world" message contains many such predictive indicators of war, but in a 
purely verbal and intuitive form. Three of these (prior war, relative capabilities, and alliance 
levels) are converted into operational language and then put to the empirical test. In general, the 
indicators do not predict war (over the past 150 years) as postulated by the Administration. These 
tests are, however, very incomplete, and our objective is not to evaluate the Administration's 
arguments, but to suggest one way in which indicators could improve the quality of foreign 
policy formulation. 
Introduction 
A m o n g  the several " m o v e m e n t s "  o f  the pas t  decade,  one o f  the more  interest ing and 
durab le  is the social  indica tors  movement .  In  an effort to  cope with the  increasing 
complexi t ies  o f  social  p lanning,  as well as wi th  the increasing mi l i tance  o f  the  social ly  
d i sadvantaged ,  prac t i t ioners  and  academics  have sought  to develop more  effective tools  
for  the planning,  executing, and  evaluat ing  o f  social  policy. Centra l  to that  enterpr ise  
* This is a revised and abbreviated version of the paper originally prepared for the 1972 meetings 
of tbe American Political Science Association held in Washington, D.C. We want to acknowledge 
the important assistance of Hugh Wheeler, the comments and help of John Stuckey, Russell Leng, 
Stuart Bremer, Catherine Kelleher, and Charles Gochman, and the support of the National Science 
Foundation under grant no. GS-28476X1. 
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has been the effort to conver t  many  o f  the vague not ions  associa ted with "qua l i ty  
o f  l i fe" into more  precise and  opera t iona l  language.  As a result,  we now have quant i -  
ta t ive indica tors  which are  designed to tap  o r  reflect not  only  such tangible  condi t ions  
as "ful l  e m p l o y m e n t "  or  "na t iona l  p roduc t , "  but  more  elusive condi t ions  such as the 
j o b  sat isfact ion,  hea l th  care, educa t iona l  achievement ,  and  envi ronmenta l  qual i ty  o f  
a given populat ion.1 
As these i l lus t ra t ions  make  clear,  the his tor ical  origins are  found  largely in the area  
o f  economic  activity,  with such measurement  occurr ing in the "sof te r"  sectors only  
in the more  recent  per iod.  Whi le  it  is l ikely, for  reasons that  will become clear  as this 
pape r  unfolds ,  that  some o f  us may  have gone ove rboa rd  in our  en thus iasm for these 
more  c o n t e m p o r a r y  indicators ,  they have a l ready  begun to demons t ra te  their  utility.2 
In  the foreign pol icy  sector,  on the o ther  hand,  the ut i l i ty o f  indica tors  has  been largely 
ignored.  Outs ide o f  the thought fu l  exhor ta t ions  o f  scholars  such as Bobrow,  one finds 
l i t t le  explicit  a t ten t ion  to the kinds  o f  indicators  tha t  might  be developed,  or  the ways 
in which they might  improve  the  efficacy a n d / o r  humaneness  o f  na t iona l  foreign 
policies.3 In  the art icle which follows, we hope  to focus a t ten t ion  on some o f  the possible  
app l ica t ions  o f  foreign pol icy  indicators  and  to i l lustrate the potent ia l  tha t  may  a l ready  
lie close at  hand.  
a For some examples and discussions, see: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Report on the Worm Social Situation, N.Y.: United Nations (1957-); Raymond A. Bauer (ed), 
Social Indicators, Cambridge: MIT Press (1966); Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (eds), 
Indicators of Social Change, N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation (1968); Commission on the Social 
Sciences, National Sciences Board, Knowledge into Action: Improving the Nation's Use of the Social 
Sciences, Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation (1969); U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Toward a Social Report, Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing 
Office (1969); Otis Dudley Duncan, Toward Social Reporting: Next Steps, N.Y. : Russell Sage Founda- 
tion (1970); Amitai Etzioni, "Indicators of the Capacities for Societal Guidance," The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 388 (March 1970); Fred R. Harris (ed), Social 
Science and National Policy, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton (1970); and Eli Goldston, The Quantification 
of Concern: Some Aspects of  Social Accounting, N.Y. : Columbia University Press (1972). One of 
the earliest efforts to tap a particularly remote social condition is in Norman Bradburn and David 
Caplovitz, Reports on Happ#tess, Chicago: Aldine (1965). And for one attempt to apply social indica- 
tors to the quality of life in the global system, see J. David Singer, "Individual Values, National 
Interests, and Political Development in the International System," in Horowitz (ed), Studies in 
Comparative International Development, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage (1971). A recent bibliography is 
Leslie Wilcox et al, Social Indicators and Societal Monitoring : An Annotated Bibliography, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier (1972). 
2 A recurrent theme in the criticism is that expressed by Irving Kristol in "In Search of the Missing 
Social Indicators," Fortune (Aug. 1, 1969): "These statistics are organized primarily for manage- 
ment purposes . . . .  We can account for public money spent [for example] on mental health, but we 
haven't the faintest idea whether our mental health is getting better or worse. More than that, we don't 
even have as yet the conceptual apparatus that would enable us to say what we mean by mental 
health, much less permit us to measure it by a series of index numbers." 
Other criticisms--especially of certain economic indicators--are their failure to reflect inequalities 
in distribution, the assumption that advertising or military expenditures are social "goods," and their 
inabifity to tap the more general concepts of welfare. In response to the latter criticism, one economist 
retorted: "Producing a summary measure of social welfare is a job for a philosopher-king, and there 
is no room for a philosopher-king in the federal government." Arthur Okun, "Should GNP Measure 
Social Welfare?" Brookings Bulletin 8/3 (1971) 4-7. 
a See Davis Bobrow and Judah Schwartz (eds), Computers and the Policy Making Community, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall (1968); Davis Bobrow, "International Indicators," N.Y.: 
American Political Science Association (Sept. 1969); and Davis Bobrow, "Political and Social 
Forecasting," Gaithersburg, Maryland: National Bureau of Standards (March 1970). 
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Indicators and their Foreign Policy Applications 
In this opening section we cover a number of preliminary points before turning to 
our specific assignment. First, we attempt to define what we mean by indicators, how 
they are devised and evaluated, and how they may be differentiated. We then go on to 
summarize their possible roles in the policy process. Following these preliminaries, 
we will turn to a more specific application of certain indicators that, while devised 
for basic research, may turn out to be useful for applied prognosis as well. 
Indicators as Proxies 
When we speak of  indicators in the context of social phenomena, it is useful to 
distinguish between two different usages of the term. The first and most familiar usage 
is in the sense of a proxy, surrogate, symptom, representation, measure, or index. 
That is, many of the concepts that we use in describing social phenomena do not have 
easily observed empirical referents. Rather, we make an inferential leap of greater or 
lesser magnitude from some trace or proxy, which we do observe, back to the pheno- 
menon of interest, which often remains unobserved. The condition or event in which 
we are interested may be unobserved because it has occurred in the past and is gone 
from sight, or is spread over too broad a space, or has too many component elements, 
or is sufficiently intangible as to lie beyond the human senses. To illustrate, we may 
infer the severity of a war from the battle deaths estimates that are compiled after- 
wards, or the industrial capability of a nation from its steel production, or the material 
quality of life from infant mortality rates, or the ego strength of an individual from 
his responses to certain projective tests, or the efficacy of a therapeutic treatment from 
the patients' average stay in hospital. 
In other words, we try to "operationalize" the more elusive concept or variable by 
devising a procedure through which its presence, strength, or rate of change might 
be indirectly measured or inferred. If  the same operation or procedure, applied to the 
same phenomenon, gives the same "reading" regardless of who conducts it or when, 
we say that the index or indicator is a reliable one. But devising reliable indicators is 
only part of the struggle to "observe the unobservable." More difficult and ambiguous 
is the validity of an indicator: the extent to which it really does tap or reflect the pheno- 
menon we claim to be getting at and measuring. Whereas reliability is easily demonstra- 
ted by repeated observational tests, validity always remains partially a matter of 
judgment. There are, however, some ways in which we can go beyond mere assertion 
as to the validity of an indicator. One is the extent to which an alternative indicator 
of the allegedly identical phenomenon gives us a set of readings which are highly 
correlated with those produced by the original indicator. For example, caloric intake 
might correlate highly (but negatively) with infant mortality, suggesting that both 
might be valid indicators of material quality of life; or the energy consumption of a 
nation might correlate highly with its steel production, strengthening our confidence 
in the validity of both as possible indicators of industrial capability. 
A second strategy in the search for validity is to ascertain whether the readings on 
our indicator conform to what one's model or " theory" would predict. If, for example, 
our model predicts that the "diplomatic interdependence" of pairs of nations should 
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increase as their trade increases, and the number of nations with whom they both have 
diplomatic relations does indeed increase following a rise in their trade, we have some 
grounds for believing that the number of nations with whom both members of each 
pair have relations is a valid indicator of their diplomatic interdependence. 
But when all is said and done, the most important test is that of "face validity": 
are competent specialists persuaded that the indicator really taps the unobserved 
phenomenon ? And that usually rests, in turn, on the extent to which we believe that: 
(a) changes in the unobserved phenomenon of interest lead to, or cause, commensurate 
changes in the value of the indicator; (b) changes in the value of the proxy or trace 
that serves as the indicator will lead to, or cause, commensurate changes in the actual 
event or condition of interest; or (c) the values of the variable and its alleged indicator 
at least rise and fall together, despite the absence of any causal link. In the latter case 
it may merely be that some third factor exercises an equally strong impact on both 
the variable and its indicator. 
Indicators as Predictors 
Shifting now from the use of indicators as proxies for, or traces of, some less readily 
observed phenomenon, there is a second and more complex role for social indicators. 
This is the predictive or early warning role, in which the indicator continues to serve 
as a proxy or reflection of some unobserved phenomenon, while at the same time it 
also predicts the changes in the magnitude of some subsequent phenomenon. That is, 
its magnitude is supposed to rise and fall with the magnitude of both the subsequent 
phenomenon and the indicator of that latter event or condition. While an indicator, 
when used for proxy purposes, is usually measured after (or simultaneous with) 
changes in the phenomenon it supposedly reflects, it is measured beforehand when used 
for predictive purposes. 
More important than temporal sequence, however, is the extent to which our pre- 
dictor co-varies with another indicator rather than the extent to which it co-varies 
with some unobserved phenomenon. While this makes it easier to ascertain the degree 
of co-variation, it also means that we must now deal with the problems of reliability 
and validity of the indicators at each end of the chain. These reliability and validity 
links are illustrated in the following diagram, in which time runs from left to right 
and observability runs from top to bottom. 
I 
. Indicator P [ - - - - - - ~  [ 
Predictor ] 




The broken vertical lines leading down from the indicators to the variables em- 
phasize that the latter will often lie below some threshold of direct observability, and 
their presence or strength will thus have to be inferred from the presence and strength 
of the indicators which we devise to represent them. The solid line between indicators 
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P and 0 reminds us that it is a simple matter to observe the correlation or co-variation 
between our predictive and outcome indicators. 
But the very simplicity of ascertaining the correlation between indicators can often 
mislead us into thinking that we have, by that operation, ascertained the predictive, 
and perhaps even the causal, connection between the unobserved phenomena them- 
selves. If  we are merely inferring a predictive relationship between the variables, the 
only (!) threat fo that inference lies in the validity and the reliability of our two indica- 
tors. But if we want to infer, from a strong correlation between indicators P and O, 
that changes in the predictor variable cause changes in the outcome variable, all sorts 
of additional difficulties arise. Since, however, our concern here is not with explana- 
tion and causality, but only with the more manageable problem of early warning and 
prediction, we can side-step these philosophical issues for the nonce. Suffice to say, 
then, that the weak dotted line conveys the tenuousness of any causal link between the 
two variables, as well as the extent to which the predictive link between them depends 
on the quality of their respective indicators. 
The Policy Uses of Indicators 
Bearing in mind these two meanings of  indicator, as well as the dangers of over- 
interpretation, let us next mention some of  the ways in which each type of indicator 
might be used for policy purposes. They may, of course, be useful not only in: (a) 
the formulation of policy, but in (b) the monitoring of  its execution, and (c) the 
evaluation of  its success. 
In the formulation stage, we may use indicators in both their proxy and predictor 
roles. The former are used to tell us something of the state of  the world at the moment, 
and the direction and rate of  change in the conditions and events of  interest. The latter 
may help us to predict which outcomes are most likely to arise out of those conditions, 
and thus, which of them should be perpetuated (or modified) in order to arrive at (or 
avoid) some future outcome. In the monitoring stage, we rely primarily on proxy 
indicators, hoping that they can tell us whether or not the assigned or agreed actions 
have been executed, and how close certain of the transition conditions are to those 
expected and thought of  as necessary to a successful outcome. And in the evaluation 
stage, we again turn to proxy indicators to measure the success of  the policy, by 
observing the discrepancy between the ultimate outcome and that which we had pre- 
dicted and preferred. Moreover, such objective evaluation can be utilized for self- 
correcting feedback purposes, and provide the basis for change in our predictive 
models. That is, if the magnitude of the outcome indicator is not as predicted, we know 
that the appropriate predictor conditions were not those that the model led us to 
believe, and that other preconditions will have to be established to arrive at the 
desired outcome. Needless to say, if the indicator is not a valid one, or if the numbers 
are fictitious, reliance on them can be disastrous. In the Vietnam War, for example, 
U.S. personnel appear to have not only inflated such indicators as body counts and 
truck interdictions, but, worse yet, assumed that they were valid indicators of military 
success. 
For predictive indicators to be of  much use, however, they must not only satisfy 
the measurement criteria of  reliability and validity. Whereas the historian or political 
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scientist is often satisfied with the construction of  an indicator that merely meets these 
two cr i ter ia--on the assumption that it will in due course be scientifically useful--- 
the policymaker must demand more. He or she must be satisfied that it is also a 
dependable predictor. Either through his own experience, or on the basis of  highly 
credible academic research, he must be persuaded that, in a reasonably large number 
of  cases, the indicator turns out to be a solid predictor. Now, some will ask how solid 
a job of  prediction the indicator or index must do before it becomes useful in the policy 
process. Some officials will insist on 100 percent performance, and will shy away from 
any indicator unless there is a demonstrated correlation of  1.0 between it and the 
hoped for, or feared, outcome. The purist would, for example, refuse to take seriously 
a prediction that increased military pressure by A leads to increased diplomatic resis- 
tance from B unless that association has ahvays occurred. 
This seems overly conservative in two ways. First, it ignores the hard fact that 
foreign offices are always playing the odds, and no matter  how unconscious the opera- 
tion may be, the estimation of probabilities goes into almost all predictions. Second, 
this very tendency to think probabilistically reflects an important reality of  the political 
world: very few events or conditions are certain. It  is not only the state & o u r  know- 
ledge about  diplomatic behavior and the changing state of  the global system; it is also 
that some degree of  randomness will always inhere in these phenomena. Thus, we 
urge that at this early stage in the development of  solid knowledge about international 
politics, we set more modest and realistic standards. We are not prepared to state 
what the performance level of  an indicator should be in order to take it seriously, but 
we would point out that, if track records were kept, most of  us would hope to do 
better than the two-out-of-three score of  U.S. experts on non-routine predictions. 4 
Predictive Indicators in the State of the World Message 
So much, then, for the usefulness of  foreign policy indicators in the abstract. Let us 
shift now to a more specific real world context, in which we find some promising signs 
of  an increased role for such indicators. Reference is to the "state of  the world" 
message inaugurated by President Nixon and his special assistant for national security 
affairs, Henry Kissinger. 
The first of  these was presented to the Congress, and the wider world at home and 
4 In one of the few efforts to estimate such performance, Jensen found that U.S. State and Defense 
Department respondents scored 67 % and 63 % respectively on 25 predictions made in 1965 re: diplo- 
matic events which did or did not occur in the next half decade; see Lloyd Jensen, "Predicting 
International Events," Peace Research Reviews (1972). 
Among the discussions of international event prediction, and tentative efforts to devise predictive 
indicators, are: Stuart Carter Dodd, "A Barometer of Perceived International Security," Public 
Opinion Quarterly 9/2 (Summer 1945) 194-200; Gaston Bouthoul, "Les Barom6tres Pol~mologiques," 
Etudes Poldmologiques 1 (1971) 1-26; Rudolph Rummel, "Forecasting International Relations: 
A Proposed Investigation of Three-Mode Factor Analysis," Technological Forecasting 1 (1969) 197- 
216; Arthur Vogel, "Toward a Foreign Policy Reporting System," Worm Affairs 133/2 (Sept. 1970); 
Uolevi Arosalo, "East-West Trade as a Potential Indicator of International Tension," Tampere, 
Finland: Instant Research on Peace and Violence 3 (1971) 120-125; Norman Z. Alcock, "The Pre- 
diction of War," Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute (1972); and Alan Newcombe and James 
Wert, An Inter-Nation Tensiometer for the Prediction of War, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research 
Institute (in press). A different approach is the Delphi method; see Norman Dalkey (ed), Studies 
in the Quality of Life: Delphi and Decision-Making, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington (1972). 
276 
abroad, at the beginning of  Nixon's second year in the White House (18 February 
1970). Entitled U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, it re- 
presented both a report on the Administration's first year of  foreign policy stewardship 
and a statement of  predictions and preferences regarding the near and middle future. 
Linked in style and timing to the traditional State of  the Union message, it was quickly 
dubbed--with official encouragement--the "state of  the world" message. The second, 
third, and fourth ones (25 February 1971, 9 February 1972 and 3 May 1973) were 
similar in form and orientation to the first, and like their predecessor, carried the peace 
theme in the subtitle. 
While there is always some tendency to dismiss such reports as self-serving pro- 
paganda and political smokescreen, these state of the world messages obviously have 
other purposes as well.5 In addition to assuring the Congress, the media, and the 
domestic public of  the Administration's competence, patriotism, farsightedness, and 
commitment to peace, the document also meets two other important needs. One is 
that o f  communicating a range of signals to other governments, friendly and otherwise, 
and to some of  the world's intergovernmental organizations, in a fairly general and 
noncommittal fashion. The other is to provide guidance and legitimation to U.S. 
officials in Washington and in the field. 
Finally, although the authors may not have so intended, the state of  the world 
message provides in one place the sort of  general overview of  world politics that policy 
analysts may examine for a variety of purposes. One might, by techniques ranging 
from those of  biblical exegesis to quantitative content analysis, search for all sorts of 
patterns, trends, deviations, inconsistencies, subtle clues, blunt warnings, articulated 
and unarticulated premises, and so forth.6 Our purpose is more limited, and our 
technique quite simple. 
Given the persistence of the "peace" theme in all four messages to date, we sought 
tO tap the Administration's collective views as to which particular events and conditions 
make for peace, conflict, and war in the modern global system and its subsystems. 
More specifically--and even allowing for the possibility of intentionally misleading 
statements or deliberately vague interagency compromise phrases--the document 
offers an excellent opportunity to identify the sorts of indicators used by this Adminis- 
tration, implicitly or explicitly, to predict to, or away from, war. Once these indicators 
have been "teased out" of the document, we might then be able to convert them into 
more operational language and then ascertain the extent to which they have been 
dependable predictive indicators in the past. That is, given the tendency of the U.S. 
and other foreign policy establishments to base their forecasts on "lessons of  the past" 
5 James Reston, in the N. Y. Times (19 Feb. 1970), likened the first one to a maxicoat in that "it is 
long, it covers a lot of territory, and it conceals the most interesting parts." Other media reactions 
included that of David Lawrence in U.S. News and Worm Report (Feb. 28, 1972, p. 92), who saw the 
third report "as one of the most weighty, most serious, and best argued statements of American 
foreign policy to be made since the end of the Second World War." The Palm Beach Post-Times 
(Feb. 12, 1972) on the other hand, described the same one as "an election year exercise in political 
propaganda," full of "chest-beating superlatives" set in "gloss and glitter." 
6 For a systematic, if somewhat superficial, effort to tap the superpowers' operational codes during 
the late 1950s, via the State Department Bulletin, Pravda, etc., see J. David Singer, "Soviet and Ameri- 
can Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulations," Conflict Resolution 8]4 (Dec. 
1964) 424-85. 
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and what "history tells," it is not inappropriate to ask how closely those "lessons" 
conform to the systematically observed regularities. 
In so doing, however, we cannot overemphasize the tentative nature of  this com- 
parison. First, despite a conscientious effort to avoid it, we may have misinterpreted 
the phraseology of  these reports, and attributed a position to the Administration which 
is not justified. This danger is more real when dealing with pre-operational statements, 
and as foreign policymakers begin to speak in more precise terms, via the explicit use 
of  indicators, the possibility of  misinterpretation will, of  course, decline. Second, we 
are looking here at only a small part  of  the historical evidence: that which has been 
generated by a single research enterprise, the Correlates of  War project at The Univer- 
sity of  Michigan. When the work of  such scholars as Nor th  and Rosecrance and their 
colleagues is brought to bear, a more adequate test of  these historical predictions (or 
post-dictions) will be possible.7 And, third, given the tentative nature of  the results 
emerging from these projects, it would be premature to claim that we have really 
pinned down the historical correlations to which we refer. 
What  we have attempted here, then, is a two-step operation involving these reports. 
First, we have selected f rom them a number of  predictive statements which embody, 
if only implicitly, the idea of  early warning indicators in the area of  war and peace. 
These are statements which predict that certain preconditions will increase the pro- 
bability of  war for the international system, its regions, or certain specific nations. 
Second, we have translated these statements into more operational language, using the 
indicators which had been devised earlier for the Correlates of  War project. Rather 
than spell out the reasoning and procedures behind each of these indicators here, we 
will cite the book or article in which that information can be found.8 And, third, we 
have asked-- in  a tentative and illustrative fashion only- -how regularly the predictor 
indicators and the war outcomes have been associated in the manner postulated by 
the Administration. Thus, in each of  the following sections, we will offer the predictive 
statement as it appears in one of the state of  the world reports, summarize how we 
convert the predictor variable into an operational indicator, and examine the extent 
to which it has been correlated with war over the century and a half f rom the Congress 
of  Vienna through 1965.9 
7 See, as illustrative, Robert North and Nazli Choucri, Nations in Conflict: Prelude to World War ! 
(forthcoming), and Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in Worm Politics, Boston: Little, Brown 
(1963). 
Some would say post-diction or retro-diction, but it seems reasonable to speak of pre-diction, even in 
the past, as long as we have not yet observed and recorded the unfolding of events or the extent to 
which the predictor and outcome variables did indeed co-vary. 
8 For the indicators, as well as the rationale and procedures, on the incidence of war at the systemic 
regional, pairwise, and national levels, see J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages o f  War, 
1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook, N.Y. 9 Wiley (1972). As these dates imply, those wars that had 
not ended, or even begun, by December 31, 1965 are not included: the several Indochina Wars, the 
Six Day War in the Mideast, the Football War, and those in Yemen, Aden, and Angola. 
A useful summary of the overall project will be found in J. David Singer, "The Correlates of War 
Project: Interim Report and Rationale," Worm Politics 24/2 (Jan. 1972) 243-70. 
9 We must differentiate here between the generalizations which can be drawn from a study of com- 
parable cases out of the past, and the sort of dynamic models which can be generated and tested from 
an examination of the processes which link these cases together as they unfold across time. As 
Bobrow reminds us in "International Indicators" op. cit, p. 5, without adequate models "we have 
no more than descriptive trend plots which lack explanatory power and ignore interaction effects." 
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Acceptance of War Leads to More War 
Let us turn now to the first of  the predictors we have selected for discussion f rom 
the state of  the world messages. One of the more widely accepted propositions in the 
folklore of  international politics is that war begets war, on the premise that: (a) the 
victorious initiator of  war will seek to repeat his success; (b) that another will be 
encouraged by the example; or (c) that the defeated party will, alone or with others, 
move as soon as feasible to settle old scores. In any event, we find in the 1972 report 
(p. 148) the proposition that "the resort to military solutions, if accepted, would only 
tempt other nations in delicately poised regions of  tension to try the same." 
The predictor variable, like most of  those used in diplomacy, can be interpreted 
(and thus operationalized) in several ways. At one extreme, we can merely ask whether 
wars come in bunches like epidemics. At the other, we can set up increasingly restricted 
conditions and ask, for example, whether initiators of  wars are more likely to do so 
again when they have emerged victorious and/or unchallenged; since the number  of  
versions of  this hypothesis is quite large, and we hope to examine them in a fairly 
exhaustive fashion in a subsequent paper, here we will look at just a few versions for 
purposes of  illustration. 
In its simplest form, then, we can interpret "resort  to military solutions" to mean 
war in general. Historically, does war lead to more war ? During the 150 years from 
1816 through 1965, 93 serious international wars began (wars with 1000 or more 
battle deaths). How often were such wars followed by another within the same or 
subsequent year?10 It  turns out that 53 (57 %) of  the 93 wars were so followed by 
another war. But what does this tell us about  war contagion ? For  instance, how likely 
is it that those 53 wars would have been followed shortly by another war, on the basis 
of  chance alone ? 
To test this "null"  hypothesis (that it was mere chance), we use the year as our unit 
of  analysis, and ask whether those years during which international war began were 
more likely to be followed by another war in the same or subsequent year than were 
those years in which no war began. It  turns out that the 93 wars in our study began in 
70 different years. Of  those 70 war years, 51 saw the onset of  one war, 16 saw two wars 
begin, two years saw three wars, and one year was cursed with the onset of  four. Of  
the 51 single war years, 22 were followed by at least one war in the subsequent year. 
Those 22, plus the 19 multiple-war years, make a total of  41 years in which war that 
began in one year was followed by at least one more beginning in the same or sub- 
sequent year. That  is, while 41 war years were followed by subsequent war years, 
this also holds for 40 nonwar years. This is a negligible difference and could easily 
have occurred by chance alone. Turning the question around, we can ask how many 
10 Throughout this section, we use this time span of 1-2 years as a reasonable measure of "following 
soon," since a longer period would obliterate all distinctions between inter-war intervals. That is, 
with 93 international wars over the century and a half, we get an average of almost two wars every 
3 years, meaning that almost all three year periods would see war following war. And if we eliminate 
the 43 imperial and colonial wars, looking only at those 50 which were between sovereign states, 
there would be an average of one war beginning every three years. See Wages and War, op cit, Chap. 
9. 
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w a r  and nonwar years were followed by nonwar years. Here it turns out that 29 of  
the war years and 40 of  the nonwar years were not followed by the onset of  a new w a r  
in the next year. And while this difference is greater than the first--and is in the direc- 
tion predicted by the President's message--i t  is nevertheless far from impressive. 
TABLE l a  
Frequency with which War Years are Followed by War Years, 1816-1965 
War year ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 41 40 Z2 : 1.11 
follows? No 29 40 Q = 0.17 
70 + 80 = 150 
Using the contingency table (Table la) to summarize these figures, we set up two 
columns, at the bot tom of which we show that 70 of the 150 years studied were marked 
by the onset of  one or more serious wars, while 80 were not. Next we set up two rows, 
so that we can divide the two columns between those years that were followed by war 
and those that were not. With the four figures (plus the column totals and their sum, 
as a check on our arithmetic, and for later purposes of  estimating the statistical 
significance of  our results) we cart calculate the extent to which the observed distri- 
bution deviates from pure randomness. That  is, if the phenomena being examined 
were completely random, and without some meaningful pattern, all four cells would 
contain approximately the same number of  cases, or about 37 or 38. Thus, by visual 
inspection alone, we see that the 41-40 difference between war and nonwar years 
followed by war years is not particularly great, whereas the 29-40 difference seems 
somewhat sharper. But if  we calculate more precisely the strength of association, we 
find a Yule's Q score of  only 0.17. And, since we can occasionally get low Q's which 
are nevertheless statistically significant, as well as high Q's by chance alone, we 
compute the deviation f rom randomness as reflected in a coefficient such as )~2 (chi- 
square) and then check it out in a significance table. In this case, the X 2 value of 1.11 
is so low that we conclude it could easily have emerged by sheer chance. 
But this is, after all, much too primitive a test of  the Administration's hypothesis, 
and a number of  more refined ones seem to be called for. To illustrate, given the 
possibility that there are important differences between the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, it makes sense to test the war-begets-war hypothesis for the two periods 
separately. In the nineteenth (Table lb), where 45 of the 84 years (1816 through 1899) 
saw the onset of  war, 31 of  them were indeed soon followed by another war, whereas 
only 14 were not. While not dramatic, this is certainly in the direction postulated by 
the state of  the world message. In the twentieth, on the other hand (Table lc), where 25 
of the 66 years (1900 through 1965) saw the onset of  war, only I0 were followed by 
another war year, whereas 15 were not. This is contrary to the prediction, but again, 
not overwhelmingly so. Rather than rely on visual inspection of these two sets 0f  
figures, though, we once more invoke the Q and x2 formulae, which take account of  the 
figures in all four cells of  each century's matrix. And, as we would suspect from the very 
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probable x 2 values o f  2.00 and 0.26 respectively,  the Q values are  also sufficiently low 
(0.31 and  0.13) to confi rm tha t  the  his tor ical  pa t t e rn  was qui te  weak  in each o f  the  
centuries  separately.  
TABLE lb 
Nineteenth Century 
War year ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 31 21 •2 = 2.00 
follows? No 14 18 Q = 0.31 
45 § 39 = 84 
TABLE le 
Twentieth Century 
War year ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 10 19 X 2 = 0.26 
follows? No 15 22 Q = 0.13 
25 + 41 = 66 
TABLE 2 
Frequency with which Wars in which Victim was not aided are Followed by War 
Victim aided ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 6 15 X 2 = 0.12 
follows? No 7 22 Q = 0.11 
13 q- 37 = 50 
But this may  still be too  crude an in te rpre ta t ion  o f  the  Admin i s t r a t i on ' s  p ropos i t ion .  
Perhaps  the phrase  " i f  accep ted"  m a y  well be  essential  to an unders tand ing  o f  the  
au thors '  meaning :  tha t  the  vict im o f  a rmed  a t t a ck  was no t  p r o m p t l y  and  v igorous ly  
jo ined  by  others  who came to its defense. Thus,  we now ask  how frequent ly  we find 
such cases fo l lowed by  subsequent  resor t  to force. Res t r ic t ing  ourselves to  the 50 inter-  
state wars which m a r k  the 1816-1965 per iod  ( thus excluding the colonia l  and  imper ia l  
wars, which rarely engaged th i rd  part ies) ,  our  Table  2 mat r ix  shows tha t  13 were 
m a r k e d  by  such in tervent ion on the side o f  those who were a t tacked,  while 37 were 
not . l l  Since six o f  the 13 former  cases (46 ~ )  were soon fol lowed by  ano ther  war  and  
15 o f  the 37 la t ter  were (41 ~o), it wou ld  appea r  to make  little difference whether  " resor t  
to  mi l i ta ry  so lu t ions"  was accepted by  the rest o f  the  na t ions  in the system or  not.  Tha t  
is, wars in which the vict im is left to fight a lone are not  significantly more  l ikely to  
be fol lowed by  more  war  than  those  in which the vict im of  a r m e d  a t t ack  is j o i n e d  by  
others.  
11 Inter-state wars are differentiated from extra-systemic ones in that the former (N = 50) have 
at least one sovereign state member of the system on each side, whereas the latter (N = 43) see system 
members fighting against colonies and other less-than-sovereign national entities which do not qualify 
for system membership. 
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Alternatively, "accepted" could be interpreted to mean that the initiators were 
permitted to emerge victorious, and that under those conditions, war might beget 
more war. Here again (Table 3a) the evidence is mixed. Thus, of the 50 inter-state 
wars in our population of  cases, the initiators "won" 34 of them.12 In 12 of those 34 
cases (35 %), renewed inter-state warfare broke out in the near future. Conversely, 
on those 16 occasions in which the initiator did not win, the number followed by war 
was nine (56 70). While this is a higher proportional figure, the Q value of 0.40 is not 
quite enough to justify the counter-conclusion that peace is best preserved by per- 
mitting the initiator to win. 
TABLE 3a 
Frequency with which Wars in which Initiator Wins are Followed by War 
Initiator wins ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 12 9 X 2 = 1.96 
follows ? No 22 7 Q = 0.40 
34 + 16 = 50 
TABLE 3b 
Nineteenth Century 
Initiator wins ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 6 6 X 2 = 4.30; p < 0.05 
follows ? No 13 2 Q = 0.73 
19 + 8 = 27 
In this context, we might again ask whether the historical evidence is more solid 
in one or the other of our two centuries. In the 19th, which saw 27 of  the 50 inter-state 
wars, 19 were won by the initiator. But only six of those 19, or 32 7o, were followed by 
war, while six of  the eight, or 75 7o, which were lost by the initiator were so followed. 
Here, the Q coefficient is a rather strong 0.73, and the X2 of  4.30 is strong enough to 
permit a rejection of  the null hypothesis; p < 0.05 means that it had a probability of  
less than 5 7o of  occurring by sheer chance. The interesting thing, however, is that the 
pattern is quite the opposite of that predicted by the Administration. In other words, 
for the nineteenth century, wars that the initiator lost were more likely to be quickly 
followed by another. 
What about the twentieth century ? Here we find that seven of  the 15 (47 700) wars 
won by the initiator in this century were soon followed by war, while only two of  the 
12 We must emphasize that we are only identifying the nations which took the first act of war and 
initiated military hostilities. This is not always (as in the Franco--Prussian War) the side whose 
behavior made the war most likely. To ascertain that with any confidence requires a very detailed 
and reproducible coding of the events leading up to the war, and we are now engaged in that enter- 
prise; see Russell Leng and J. David Singer, "Toward a Multi-Theoretical Typology of International 
Behavior," (forthcoming). A similar problem exists in identifying the "winner," and for this analysis 
we merely accept the consensus of the historians who dealt with each of these wars. The Korean War 
is treated as a "draw"; see Wages of  War op cit, Chap. 14. 
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eight (25 ~ )  in which the initiator lost were so fol lowed--making for a pattern just 
the reverse of  the nineteenth century experience. However, in this century, the relation- 
ships, while supporting the Administration's prediction, are not strong enough to 
permit ready acceptance of the hypothesis that the initiator's being allowed to win is 
more likely to lead to another war.  
TABLE 3e 
Twentieth Century 
Initiator wins ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 7 2 ,X2 = 1.03 
follows ? No 8 6 Q = 0.45 
15 + 8 = 23 
So far, we have found little support  for the notion that wars in which the victim 
nations are defended by other nations are less likely to be followed by another war 
than wars in which the victim is not defended. The same holds for the notion that 
defeating the initiator will inhibit the prompt  beginning of other wars. But there are 
further questions that we may ask. For example, among those specific cases in which 
the victim nation is defended by others, are the wars that are won by the initiator more 
likely to be followed by war ? The answer comes as something of a surprise to those of  
us raised on the ideas of  collective defense and collective security. As Table 4 shows, 
in the 13 cases that were marked by military support of  the victim, the initiator was 
turned back nine times. But in five of  those cases, the system saw additional war in 
the same or following year. On the other hand, if the initiator prevailed despite military 
support  for his victim (it happened four times), there is only one case in which 
additional war occurred. The Q coefficient of  0.58 comes close to suggesting that, if 
peace be the sole concern, it is better for the initiator to win. 
TABLE 4 
Frequency with which Wars in which Victim was 
Aided Successfully are Followed by War 
Victim aided successfully ? 
Yes No 
War Yes 5 t X 2 : 0.31 
follows ? No 4 3 Q = 0.58 
9 + 4 =  13 
Another way to look at this question is to shift f rom the aggregated systemic level 
of  analysis, and to focus on the specific nations themselves. Here we ask whether those 
nations which initiated war turn out to initiate another war within the following ten 
years. As Table 5 indicates, it matters a great deal whether the initiator emerged 
victorious or not. That  is, of  the 73 nations that were on the initiating side, only 13 of  
them were initiators again within the decade. But 12 of those 13 had won the first 
war, and the high Q and X 2 values show that this is a very strong and statistically 
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significant relationship; that is, such a X 2 had less than a 2 % probability of  occurring 
by chance alone. 
Further evidence as to the effect of  victory is seen in Table 6, where the coefficients 
are even more persuasive. Here, we see that of  the 98 nations that were on the side 
which was attacked, only 11 of them turned around and initiated war within the 
decade. But again, 10 of  those 11 future initiators, even though often caught un- 
prepared, nevertheless emerged on the winning side. 
TABLE 5 
Frequency with which Initiators of War Soon Initiate Another War 
Initiators win ? 
Yes No 
Initiates Yes 12 1 ~(2 = 5.82; p < 0.02 
another war? No 34 26 Q = 0.80 
46 q- 27 = 73 
TABLE 6 
Frequency with which Victims of Attack Soon Initiate Another War 
Victim wins ? 
Yes No 
Initiates Yes 10 1 ~2 = 6.77; p < 0.01 
another war? No 43 44 Q = 0.82 
53 + 45 = 98 
In sum, these two analyses suggest that it is not so much that war begets war, since 
very few nations initiate wars in the decades following prior war experience, but that 
victorious war begets war, and this finding is certainly consonant with the Administra- 
tion's hypothesis. More generally, we see that the simple proposition is in fact a rather 
complex one, and that the alternative ways of  interpreting and testing it (via many 
alternative indicators) lead to rather different conclusions. The evidence, then, is far 
from complete, and in a subsequent paper we intend to examine the epidemiology 
question in considerably greater detail. 
Weakness  Leads to War 
A close corollary of the proposition that the global community's acquiescence in 
the initiation of  war will lead to more war is that which tells us that relative weakness 
leads to war. This may be interpreted as a national level prediction, with weaker 
nations being more vulnerable and therefore more likely to have to fight in self 
defense; it may also be interpreted in systemic terms, with weakness on the part of  the 
"peace loving" (or "status quo")  nations serving as a temptation to the stronger. 
This type of  predictive statement finds repeated expression in all four of the Administra- 
tion's reports on the state of the world. It appears in particularly crisp language in the 
first of  these: "Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten 
our vital interests and those of  our allies with military force, we must be strong. 
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American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous mislcacula- 
tions" (p. 4). And the theme is echoed in 1972: "American weakness would make no 
contribution to peace. On the contrary, it would undermine prospects for peace" (p. 
155). 
In discussing the relationship, past or predicted, between war-proneness and national 
power or strength, we quickly come face to face with the familiar question of "what is 
power ?" In a forthcoming volume, we will discuss that question in painstaking detail, 
but here we must be brief. 13 First, there is the difference between a nation's power base 
or potential on the one hand, and military preparedness or other indices of force in 
being, on the other. Second, the bases of power have changed across time. Third, a 
nation's capacity to exercise influence may range considerably across space. The 
indicator we employ here is a very general one, and that limitation should be kept in 
mind as the discussion unfolds. 
We use a straightforward measure in which we combine six factors: steel production, 
energy consumption, urban population, the square root of total population, armed 
forces size, and military expenditure. For  more thorough analyses, we use several 
different combinations and weightings of  these six, but here we will merely compute 
each nation's share of  each element's distribution in the system, and then compute 
the average of its percentage shares. Thus, if a nation has 8 70 of the system's armed 
forces, steel production, and urban population, and 12 70 if its military expenditures, 
energy consumption, and total population (converted to its square root), its composite 
score would be 10 700. In the analysis at hand, restricted only to the major powers for 
the 150-year period, the rankings and scores turn out to be remarkably close to those 
that a diplomatic historian might expect; in other words, the face validity of the 
indicator--as a reflection of  general power potential--appears to be quite high. (For 
a more restricted test, and perhaps one more appropriate to the Administration's 
argument, we might want to use the military dimensions only, or better yet, an in- 
dicator which reflects the fraction of overall capabilities that has been allocated to 
military preparedness.) 
Using this composite indicator, does it turn out that major powers are more likely 
to get into war, or to be attacked, when they are: (a) nearer the bottom of the capability 
scale, or (b) experiencing a decline in relative power ? In Table 7, we present a rough 
summary of where each major power stood vis-~t-vis the others in that subset on the 
eve of its serious inter-state wars, as well as the direction in which its capabilities tended 
to be moving, in regard to the average score of the majors at that time. 
In summarizing so large a body of  information in such a table, we must emphasize 
several limitations. First, as already noted, our composite capability measure is still 
a tentative one whose validity is far from conclusive. Second, we are still refining the 
data on which the indicator is based. Third, specification of initiators and defenders 
in war is by no means self-evident, and as we complete our historical reconstruction 
of the events leading up to each war, there may be revisions as well as refinements in 
our classifications. With these caveats in mind, we look at Table 7, which lists the 
13 The data acquisition procedures, sources, theoretical arguments, and resulting scores will be 




capability status of each major power on the eve. of its entries into inter-state wars 
over the 150 years under study. 
Of the total of 59 war entries, 34 occurred when the combatant state was weaker 
than the average major power, while only 25 occurred when it was above the average 
on the composite capabilities indicator (see column totals in Tables 7 and 8). To the 
extent that we have a valid indicator of strength and that the average score con- 
stitutes a reasonable cutting point between the weaker and the stronger, the Adminis- 
tration's prediction finds some historical support. Next, we ask whether that pattern 
is reinforced by the association between the nation's war experiences and the rise, 
stability, or decline in their capability scores (see totals in table 7 and rows of table 8). 
Here we find virtually no difference: 30 occur when the major power's score is falling, 
and 29 when it is either rising or holding steady. As to the combined "effect" of both 
scores, the 13-12 and 16-18 figures reinforce the impression that present strength is 
moderately important and that direction of change is of minor consequence. On the 
other hand, the U.S. experience is unique in that all three of its wars (since joining the 
major power class)began while it was in the upper half, but on the decline. 
It is, of course, one thing to participate in a serious war and quite another to be 
more or less compelled to do so, as a result of another power's initiation of hostilities. 
Thus, we now move on to refine our inquiry, and ask how frequently the victims of 
military assault by another major power were on the high or low side of the major 
TABLE 7 
Relative Capabilities of Major Powers Prior to Their Entry into Inter-state Wars 
Above major power average Below major power average 
Steady or rising Falling Steady or rising Falling 
France Franeo-Span, Roman Repub, W W  1, 1914 W W  II, 1939 
1823 1849 Korean, 1951 
Navarino Bay, Ital Unif, 1859 Sinai, 1956 
1827 Sino-French, 





Britain Anglo-Persian, Navarino Bay, W W  1I, 1939 
1856 1827 Korean, 1950 
Crimean, 1854 Sinai, 1956 
W W  I, 1914 
Germany W W  1, 1914 2nd Schles- 1st Schles- 















Seven Weeks, 1866 
W W  1, 1914 
Italo-Roman, Seven Weeks, 
1860" 1866 
Italo-Sicil, 1860" Italo-Turk, 1911 
W W  1, 1915 Italo-Ethiop, 
1935 
WW II, 1940 
Russia Crimean, 1853 Navarino Bay, W W  1, 1914 Russo-Turk, 1877 
Russo-Jap, 1904 1827 
Russo-Jap, 1939 Russo-Turk, 1828 
Russo-Finn, Russo-Hung, 
1939 1956 
W W  11, 1941 
W W L  1914 
W W I I ,  1939 
Korean, 1950 
U.S. 
China Korean, 1950 
Sino--Indian, 1962 
Japan Russo--Jap, 1904 Sino--Jap, 1937 
W W  1, 1914 
Manchurian, 1931 
9 Russo-Jap, 1939 
WW II, 1941 
Totals 13 12 16 18 
Notes: (1) Italics--Attacked by another major. 
(2) Dates--Year of entry. 
(3) *--New in system and no prior measurement of its capability. 
power average, and whether their shares of  the capability pie were rising, holding 
steady, or falling. As the Q value of 0.20 and the x z of 0.09 in Table 9 show, this 
version of the Administration's proposition stands up even less well. Among the nine 
major power victims, five were above average in capability while four were below, and 
five were steady or rising while four were falling. These cell entries are as near equality 
as possible, given the N of  9. Historically, therefore, we conclude that when major  
powers have fought one another, the victim nation is no more likely to be below the 
average major power capability scores than above, and no more likely to be falling 
in its share of  the composite capabilities than it is to be rising or holding steady. 
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TABLE 8 







25 + 34 




Relative Capability Frequencies of Major Power Victims of War Initiation 
Above Below 
Steady Crimean WW I 
or Russo-Jap (04)  Fr-Pruss. 
r is ing Russo--Jap (39) X2 = 0.09 
Falling Ital. Unif. WW II Q = 0.20 
Korean Seven Weeks 
5 + 4 = 9  
Once again, though, there are alternative ways to operationalize, and put to the 
test, these state of the world propositions. In this case, it may be more important to 
compare those who were attacked to their attackers, rather than to all the other major 
powers; and the figures in Table 10 show that such a modification does make a modest 
difference. That is, in the nine major-major wars, we find that the victim was weaker 
than the attacker in just over half the cases, and that is a negligible difference. On the 
other hand, all of  the four that were stronger than their attackers were declining in 
relative capabilities, as were three of  the five that were weaker, and this pattern lends 
some credence to the state of  the world argument. To put it in its strongest sense, we 
find no cases of a major  power being attacked by another when the first was bo th  






Relative Capability Frequencies of Victims 
vs. Initiators in Major Power Wars 
Victim stronger Victim weaker 
Crimean 
Fr-Pruss. 
Ital. Unif. Seven Weeks 
Russo-Jap (04) WW II 
Russo-Jap (39) WW I 
Korean 
X 2 = 0.51 
Q cannot be calculated 
when any cell is empty 
This does not, of  course, wrap up the argument. So far, we have only examined the 
capability-war relationship when war did occur. It is equally crucial to examine those 
cases in which war did not occur. Thus, in Table 11, we summarize all the half- 
decade experiences of all the major powers, and ask two simple questions. 
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TABLE 11 
Frequencies with Which Major Powers were Below Average 
in Capabilities and Entered into War 
Below average ? 
Yes No 
Entered Yes 31 21 X 2 = 1.37 
war? No 63 63 Q = 0.19 
94 d- 84 = 178 
First, how many major power half decades are characterized by an above average 
military-industrial capability, and second, how many of  them were followed by 
entrance into one or more wars of  any type ? As the frequency distributions show, there 
were somewhat more below average than above average cases (94 to 84), but many more 
peaceful than warlike cases (126 to 52). More important, when we put the two sets 
together, we find that capability makes very little difference. Whereas more of  the 
warlike cases (31 to 21) involve below average majors, the nonwar cases include just 
as many above as below capability scores. And as the weak Q value of  0.19 and the 
X 2 of  1.37 make clear, the pattern is much too close to random to justify any inter- 
pretation either way. 
Similarly, if we look (Table 12) not at capability scores for these major power 
periods, but ask whether or not they were preceded by a fall in strength, the same 
essential picture emerges. That is, of  the 80 nation periods preceded by a fall in 
capability, 29 (33 %) were followed by war involving those majors which fell in relative 
capability, while 20 (25 %) of  those 80 that rose in capability were also followed by 
war. Again, the Q value of 0.18 reveals only very weak support of  the proposition, 
although in the predicted direction. 
TABLE 12 
Frequency of War Entry by Major Powers 
at Times of Declining Relative Capability 
Capability falling ? 
Yes No 
Entered Yes 29 20 ~z = 1.18 
war? No 60 60 Q = 0.18 
89 + 80 = 16'9 
In sum, we have found very little support for the Administration's "weakness 
leads to war" proposition. While our limited historical experiment tends to confirm 
the belief that when major power wars occur, the victim nation was falling in capability 
relative to the initiator, we cannot say much about the likelihood of getting into war 
from knowing anything about capability and direction of  change. That is, major 
powers seem to be as likely to get into war when their capability is above the major 
power average as when it is below it, and they seem as likely to get into war when 
their capability is rising as when it is falling. 
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Alliances Help to Deter War 
As intimated in the previous sections, the likelihood of war and the nature of its 
outcome will depend not only upon the relative strength of the would-be initiator and 
its victim. The capabilities of allies can often be conclusive. But it is usually too late 
to begin forming alliances once war has begun, or even on its eve; as a matter of fact, 
of the 177 formal alliances established during the 150 years under study, only eight 
were consummated during, or within the three months preceding, hostilities. This 
tendency, by itself, suggests that practitioners have generally shared the Administra- 
tion's view that "we must build an alliance strong enough to deter those who might 
threaten war" (1970, p. 27). 
Such an inquiry requires three different foci. First, is the international system less 
war-prone when alliance levels are high ? Second, are the nations which join into most 
alliances also the ones which experience the least war? Third, does high alliance 
involvement on the eve of war make a nation less likely to be drawn into that war ? 
Before examining the historical correlations between alliance levels and war, we 
should summarize the operations and reasoning behind our indicators. Despite the 
relative ease of identifying all formal alliances (at least after the archives are opened) 
and differentiating among their types, ours represents the first published effort to 
convert that diplomatic information into machine-readable, quantitative, indicators.14 
First, we only include written treaties of alliance between and among sovereign states. 
Second, we differentiate among: (a) defense pacts, in which the signatories contract to 
fight alongside one another if either is "attacked"; (b) neutrality or nonaggression 
pacts, in which the obligation is to notfight against the other; and (c) ententes, which 
oblige the signatories to consult in the event, or imminent likelihood of, hostilities. 
Third, we exclude: (a) such highly asymmetric alliances as in treaties of guarantee; 
(b) collective security arrangements such as the League and the U.N., in which the 
potential attacker may well be one of the signatories; and (c) general declarations of 
nonviolent behavior, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Geneva Conventions. 
With all alliances, members, and dates recorded, we then combine the information 
in order to measure, for each year, what percentage of the system's members are in 
one or more alliances of each type; these are our alliance aggregation indicators. For 
each nation, we ascertain the number of alliance commitments of each type it has with 
different classes of nations each year, in order to get its alliance commitment index. 
Looking at the question first in its most general form (before going on to a more 
refined analysis), we ask whether high alliance aggregation levels do indeed lead to low 
levels of war in the system, and vice versa. In Table 13 we show the "product-moment" 
correlations between the various alliance and war indicators for the entire time span, 
and then for each of the centuries separately. If  most of the high alliance aggregation 
periods were followed by high amounts of war, and the low alliance periods were 
followed by low amounts of war, these correlations would be positive, and would range 
14 For details of our coding procedures and the resulting data sets, see J. David Singer and Melvin 9 
Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," Journal of Peace Research, 3]1 
(Jan. 1966), 1-32 and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension 
of the Basic Data," Journal of Peace Research, 3 (1969) 257-282. 
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from about  + 0.50 up to a maximum possible value of + 1.00. Conversely, if these high 
alliance aggregation levels were followed by the least warlike three-year periods, the 
correlation coefficients would show a negative sign, and again could in principle 
approach a value of - 1.00. And if these alliance and war levels are temporally associa- 
ted in a largely random fashion, the coefficient values would be close to zero. Further, 
as with the contingency table analyses, we are interested in both the strength of  the 
association and the likelihood--reflected in the "statistical significance" level of  the 
correlation coefficients--that the higher ones did not occur by chance alone. 
TABLE 13 
Correlations Between Alliance Aggregation and Onset of War 
No.  of Nation Battle 
Predictors wars months deaths 
% % % 
Total Time Span 
nations in any alliance 0.00 0.27 0.26 
nations in defense pacts --0.01 0.05 --0.01 
majors in any alliance 0.01 0.20 0.20 
majors in defense pacts 0.00 0.11 0.09 
Nineteenth Century 
nations in any alliance 0.03 -0.09 -0.24 
nations in defense pacts 0.00 0.10 - 0.23 
majors in any alliance --0.21 -0.18 --0.34 
majors in defense pacts -0.16 --0.28 --0.45* 
Twentieth Century 
nations in any alliance 0.00 0.23 0.21 
nations in defense pacts --0.02 0.05 0.04 
majors in any alliance 0.34 0.31 0.28 
majors in defense pacts 0.19 0.12 0.04 
* Less than 5 ~ probability of occurring by chance alone. 
Turning to Table 13, then, we find that the patterns are very close to random for the 
total time span; regardless of  which indicators we use for the predictor and outcome 
variables, the highest correlation we find is a weakly positive one of 0.27. Skipping to 
the twentieth century alone, the signs are again by and large positive, and thus in the 
direction opposite to that predicted by the Administration, but with a somewhat more 
consistent pattern. For  example, when most of  the major powers are in one or more 
alliances, the following periods tend to be fairly warlike, as measured by the frequency 
of  wars begun as well as by their magnitude in nation months or their severity in 
battle-connected deaths. But even the 0.34 correlation had more than a 5 ~ probability 
of  occurring by chance alone. 
Reverting to the nineteenth century, however, we find a reasonably clear congruence 
between the state of  the world report 's  propositions and the historical record. Here, 
most of  the correlation coefficients are negative, but only one of  the 12 had less than 
a 5 ~ probability of  emerging by chance alone. So far, then, the Administration's view 
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is closer to that found in the previous century than in the current one, but none of 
the patterns is particularly strong. 
Turning now from a consideration of  the alliance-war relationship in the entire 
inter-state system, we examine the more restricted grouping of  major powers only. 
In this case, the query is whether those majors which had the highest levels of  alliance 
participation during their entire tenure in the system were also those which experienced 
the lowest incidence of  war involvement. Here, we can say nothing about a possible 
causal connection because these nations could, for example, have had most of  their 
alliance participation in one time period and their war involvement quite a few years 
later or earlier. In any event, if  the administration's hypothesis is correct, most of  the 
correlation coefficients should be strong and negative. As Table 14 indicates, the 
alliance-war relationship is again quite confused. 
TABLE 14 
Correlations Between Major Power Alliance Involvement 
and War Experience 
Months Battle 
No. of wars of war deaths 
Predictors per year per year per year 
All alliances 0.60 --0.39 0.13 
All Defense pacts 0.42 --0.45 0.07 
All Neut. pacts 0.25 --0.07 --0.47 
All Ententes 0.67* 0.01 0.49 
Alliances with majors 0.00 -0.26 --0.49 
Defense with majors --0.03 --0.37 --0.28 
Neut. with majors 0.11 --0.23 --0.58 
Ententes with majors 0.00 0.08 --0.66 
Alliances with minors 0.68* --0.35 0.31 
Defense with minors 0.51 --0.43 0.16 
Neut. with minors 0.28 0.00 -0.40 
Ententes with minors 0.60 --0.01 0.62 
* Less than 5 ~ probability of occurring by chance alone. 
On the other hand, there is a very consistent and rather strong positive association 
between the number of  alliances each of  the majors had and the number of  wars that 
each experienced, controlling for the length of  time that they belonged to the major 
power subsystem. But this seems to hold only for alliances with minor nations, since these 
indices of  alliances with other majors--and these were quite rare---show an essentially 
random association with their war proneness. Further, it matters considerably 
whether our indicator is the frequency with which allied powers get into war, or the 
amount of war they experience. That is, when we correlate their alliance involvement 
with the magnitude and severity of  war which they experience, we find most of  the 
coefficients to be negative, as postulated. However, none of  these is sufficiently strong 
to have had a less than 5 ~o probability of  occurring by chance alone. 
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Despite the consistency of  these positive and negative signs, we must avoid over- 
interpreting them. As noted earlier, such coefficients tell us nothing of  the temporal 
sequence; once more, a nation could have most of  its alliance involvement in one his- 
torical epoch and its wars in another. Thus, a more realistic test for the proposition 
that alliances deter war is to examine the extent to which high alliance involvement is 
closely followed by low war experience for the nations, and vice versa. 
What  we examine next is the frequency with which major power membership in 
one or more alliances in a given year is followed by entry into inter-state war during 
that same year or within the two following years. As the matr ixin Table 15 shows, there 
is virtually no discernible pattern. Of  the 648 major power alliance membership 
years, 116 (18 ~o) are followed by war entry of  the alliance members, while 532 (82 ~o) 
are not. Even though this looks as if alliance membership reduces war experience, we 
next note that of  the 239 nation-years not marked by alliance membership, 44 are 
nevertheless followed by entry into war and 195 are not. These percentages are also 
18 ~o and 82 ~o respectively, identical to those for years in which these nations were in 
alliances. The similarity of  these ratios is confirmed when we compute the X2 and Q 
coefficients, each of  which is negligible. In other words, membership in alliances 
seems to have had little effect on the historical likelihood of  major  powers getting into 
war or remaining at peace. 
TABLE 15 
Frequencies with which Majors Belonged to Alliances 
and then Entered into War. 
In alliance ? 
Yes No 
Entered Yes 116 44 X z = 0.03 
war? No 532 195 Q = 0.02 
648 + 239 = 887 
TABLE 16 
Frequencies with which Majors Joined Alliances 
and then Entered into War 
Joined alliance ? 
Yes No 
Entered Yes 31 129 X z = 2.6 
war? No I04 623 Q = 0.18 
135 -1- 752 = 887 
Finally, the historical association between alliance membership and war participa- 
tion may be examined in terms of  the effect of joining an alliance rather than merely 
being in one. In other words, does the formation of  alliances turn out to predict 
decreases in the war proneness of  nations, particularly the major  powers ? In Table 16, 
we present the familiar four sets of  frequencies, beginning with the number  of  years 
in which any of  the majors did or did not join a new alliance. We then divide those 
frequencies according to whether those joining and nonjoining years were or were not 
followed by entry into an inter-state war. We reiterate in passing that we do not count 
those few alliances which were entered into during, or less than three months before, 
293 
a war; this is to eliminate the confounding effects of those alliances which are created 
in order to fight rather than deter, a war. 
As the Q and x 2 coefficients indicate, the pattern is far from dramatic, but what 
association we do find is in the direction opposite'to that predicted. Of the 135 
alliance entries by major powers, 31 (23 ~) were followed by their entry into war, and 
104 (77~) were not. However, note that of the 752 nation-years which did not see 
major power alliance entries, only 129 (17 ~) were followed by entry into war by those 
nations, while 623 (83 ~o) were not. In other words, those powers which entered into 
alliances were somewhat more likely to subsequently get involved in war than those 
major powers which did not. But the association is far from a statistically significant 
one. 
We have, therefore, some tentative evidence that, historically, alliances have not 
prevented war. As a matter of fact, our more realistic tests of the temporal sequence 
between alliance involvement and war suggest that, in the case of alliance membership, 
major powers are as likely to get into war while participating as not, and, in the case 
of alliance formation, major powers are more likely to get into war subsequent to 
joining alliances than not. At best, then, it seems that the creation of alliances has done 
little to keep major powers out of war. 
Conclusion 
In our effort to illustrate ways in which contingent predictions ( " i f - - ,  then, - -")  in 
foreign policy might be improved via the use of operational indicators, we have merely 
scratched the surface. First of all, we have selected such predictions from only one 
set of documents reflecting a single nation and a single government. Second, we have 
only selected a fraction of those which could be examined in the light of a small part 
of a single research project. Third, all of the contingent predictions are of a simple 
bivariate nature, with a single predictor variable; and while many practitioners and 
researchers tend to think in essentially bivariate terms, a moment's pause reminds 
us that few outcomes in international politics are likely to be "determined" by a 
single factor. 
Furthermore, we have addressed ourselves primarily to the prediction problem in 
policymaking and have ignored many other critical issues, ranging from the decisional 
setting through effective policy implementation. Nor have we wrestled with the 
differentiation between factors which might have a great deal of predictive or explana- 
tory power and those which, while not theoretically powerful, may offer greater 
opportunity for conscious and timely human intervention.15 
On the other hand, this modest exercise should convey an idea of the possibility 
that we may indeed "learn from history." To begin, if we can frame our policy predic- 
tion statements in more precise language, we are already part way to the construction 
of reliable and valid indicators. If we can begin to approach history in a systematic a n d  
rigorous fashion, rather than merely ransack it for arguments and analogies that are 
15 Neither have we examined the policy recommendations that might flow from these tentative 
findir~gs. That responsibility we will take up in future papers, when focusing more thoroughly on one 
set of problems at a time. 
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convenient at the moment,  we can begin to accumulate a fair amount of  existential 
and correlational knowledge. I f  we can assimilate that knowledge through a multi- 
theoretical taxonomy, we can begin to develop modest islands of  explanatory know- 
ledge. I f  that knowledge can be integrated into alternative theories, these can be put to 
further historical test. And, from the more successful and accurate theories, additional 
predictions can be made. A sequential scenario such as this might, in due course, 
lead to the conditions sought by the conscientious policymaker. These were put nicely 
in the first state of  the world message, "Our  actions must be the products of  thorough 
analysis, forward planning, and deliberate decision . . . .  We must know the facts: 
intelligent d iscuss ions . . ,  and wise decisions require the most reliable information 
available . . . .  We must know the alternatives: we must know what our real options 
are, and not simply what compromise has found bureaucratic acceptance" (pp. 17- 
18). 16 
Having sounded this moderately sanguine note, however, it now behoves us to 
back off and face up to some of the more critical issues that confront the applied 
scientist. First, there is the question of whether social scientists should be concerned 
with the policy implications of  their research. Should we actively emphasize those 
implications, ignore them, or intentionally conceal them, to take the three dominant 
views? Further, should we make them available to some governments and not to 
others ? To some political parties and not to others ? To some agencies or bureaus and 
not to others ? In the short run, of  course, these remain fairly academic questions, 
given the paucity of  our correlational and predictive (not to mention explanatory) 
knowledge, and the skepticism of foreign office types the world over.17 
But as (and if) the proposed trend continues, and our knowledge base becomes 
more solid, these can emerge as increasingly salient questions. To respond in an 
indirect fashion, we have no illusions that all the disasters that befall mankind are a 
consequence of ignorance or incompetence; nor do we urge that if we merely under- 
stood more fully the consequences of  our actions, life would be less nasty, brutish, or 
short. Similarly, we do not suggest that there is little difference between the "good 
guys" and the "bad guys" in classifying nations, regimes, agencies, or individuals. 
But we would nevertheless argue that an applied social science is an essential concomi- 
tant of  any related efforts to move toward a world of  peace, prosperity, and justice. 
Further, the same extension and diffusion of knowledge that can permit policy- 
makers and their interpreters to become more sophisticated and insightful regarding 
the issues which confront them, can also serve to disenthrall the general citizen. 
Whether cheer-leader, nay-sayer, or merely the victim of  governmental decisions, the 
16 In the first issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (1957, p. 94), Quincy Wright proposed the 
establishment of a "world intelligence center" among whose missions would be the measurement 
of "the changing atmosphere of world opinion [and] the changing condition of world politics." Such 
a use of foreign policy itldicators, whose scores would be published on a weekly or monthly basis by 
an independent global institute, could appreciably enhance the accuracy and credibility of the facts 
and help clarify the range of alternatives to which the Administration alludes. 
17 As to the problems of communication between social scientists and the policymaker, see Philip 
Burgess, "International Relations Theory: Prospect, 1970-1995," Los Angeles, Calif.: American 
Political Science Association (1970) 9-14; and Charles Hermann, "The Knowledge Gap: The 
Exchange of Information between the Academic and Foreign Policy Communities," Chicago: 
American Political Science Association (1971). 
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man in the street can become a more critical and knowledgeable participant in the 
governmental process. And, in doing so, he will increasingly blunt one of the major 
weapons of demagogues, bigots, and warmongers: the combined ignorance which 
permits the leader, as well as the led, to believe the most ill-founded and foolish 
propaganda. 
This consideration leads us, with some reluctance, to the unattractive issue of 
pseudoscience or "scientism." Not only the general citizen and the politician, but the 
specialists in foreign and defense ministries are always in danger of being taken in by 
research that looks like science. To some extent, the universities, but more often the 
"think tanks" and industrial research firms are well populated with "number jugglers" 
whose reports have a decidedly scientific aura to them. The background factors that 
make for shoddy work are all too familiar: (a) today's strategic analyst or Middle 
East specialist was yesterday's expert on traffic safety or water pollution; (b) a large 
fraction of the organization's business comes from a mission-oriented client with the 
consequent political pressures; and (c) time pressures often guarantee a quick and 
dirty job on contract research.IS 
But most often, the source is simple ignorance at the client's end as well as at the 
researcher's end. This need not be surprising, given the durability of the "three-culture 
problem" in today's world. Sir Charles Snow reminded us of the gulf between the 
scientific culture and the humanistic culture, but he neglected to emphasize that those 
of the former class are no less ignorant of  the social sciences than those of the latter; 
engineers, physicists, and systems analysts often have even more erroneous notions 
about social systems (and how to study them) than poets, lawyers, or businessmen. 
Thus, we conclude with an emphasis on not only the familiar need for more research, 
but the less familiar one of the need for a very different kind of "education for world 
affairs." In the primary and secondary schools, in colleges and graduate schools, and 
perhaps more critically, in the public and private discussion of public policy questions, 
it is essential that we move out of the prescientific era. Superstition was of little use 
in understanding the weather or estimating the strength of a tunnel, and medieval 
notions of human physiology were of little help in diagnosing and curing disease. 
Why should we hope that such primitivism will suffice in the solution of foreign 
policy problems ? Given the destructive effects of bureaucratic politics, as well as the 
mix of good intentions and bad, there is no need to compound the felony with so large 
a measure of ignorance. Surely we can do better. 
18 These are, of course, impressionistic judgments that could and should be put to the test; a more 
affirmative view is in Roger Levien, "Independent Public Policy Analysis Organizations: A Major 
Social Invention," Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation (Nov. 1969). 
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